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Russia’s stand in support of the legitimate government of Syria as well as some 
other recent foreign policy actions 
indicate that Russia is returning to 
the centre stage of global politics as 
a major counterbalance to American 
imperialism. But domestic, socio-
economic policies are still formulated 
and implemented by a narrow group 
of outwardly pro-Western members of 
the ruling group. In order to retain its 
positions this group had to ensure its 
victory at Parliamentary elections on 
September, 18, 2016. These elections 
can hardly be called free and fair. 
The ruling United Russia party 
(UP) got 76% of mandates (343 out 
of 450). 5 years earlier it got only 238 
parliamentary seats though 5 million 
less people voted for the UR this year 
than in 2011. Where does the 76% 
support come from? The trick is that 
the electoral legislation was changed so 
that 50% of the mandates (225) were 
contested on party lists while the other 
50% were contested in single member 
constituencies. On the party lists the 
UR got 54% (5 years earlier: 49%). 
But in single-member constituencies 
(far easier to manipulate) it got an 
outrageous 90.2%. Hence the new 
average of 76%. 
However the 54% won on party 
lists is also misleading and does not 
reflect the real level of support (or 
lack thereof) of the ruling party. Many 
facts indicate massive vote rigging. 
For example, at 100 polling stations 
in the Saratov region where Volodin 
(the new Speaker of Parliament 
and former 1st Head of Presidential 
Administration in charge of domestic 
policy) was standing, the results were 
astonishingly similar: United Russia: 
62.2%; Communist Party: 11.8 %; 
Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democrats: 
9.1%; Just Russia: 6.1%. Precisely the 
same results! At 100 polling stations 
in one region! Any comment needed? 
It’s not elective democracy. I call it 
“distributive democracy”. 
Another significant factor was a 
low voter turnout. It was claimed 
that 47% of the voters came to the 
polling stations. But the hard fact is 
that in major cities the attendance 
was from 35% in Moscow to 25% in 
Saint Petersburg – the second capital of 
Russia. That means that people “voted 
with their feet” as a sign of distrust in 
the elections. In fact the ruling group 
wanted a low attendance as it created 
a bigger space for manipulation. The 
trick was that it tacitly encouraged low 
attendance in major cities with a bigger 
concentration of protest voters and 
artificially pumped up the attendance 
in rural areas where the electorate is far 
more dependent on local authorities. 
One more trick was to radically 
increase the number of political parties. 
The 2011 elections were contested 
by four major parties. But according 
to the legislation introduced years 
ago the minimal number of members 
required to register a party dropped 
hundred times - from 50 000 to 500. It 
immediately increased the number of 
parties to a ridiculous 76. 
Then the authorities felt that they 
had overplayed democracy, so only 
14 parties were allowed to participate 
in the elections. But significantly they 
were mostly those able to snatch 
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votes from the Communist Party. For 
example newly created and practically 
unknown “Communists of Russia” 
(another “Kremlin project” organised 
and financed by the ruling group) got 
2.5% of the vote simply by using the 
CPRF-type emblem and more radical 
rhetoric. 
These were relatively new methods 
of vote manipulation. However the 
“good old” methods were fully used as 
well. In many places the ballot papers 
were not even counted as the heads of 
“independent” election commissions 
(selected and controlled by the local 
authorities) simply wrote in the final 
protocols the figures submitted from the 
upper levels of falsification machinery 
(hence the above mentioned staggering 
results in Saratov). They do not need 
votes. They write the figures. The 
observers from opposition parties were 
in many cased forcefully removed from 
the polling stations. 
As a result of this “manipulative” 
and “distributive” democracy the 
leading force of the opposition – the 
Communist Party – got 42 mandates 
out of the 92 that it had before. Other 
opposition parties – Zhirinovsky’s 
Liberal Democrats and Just Russia also 
suffered very considerable losses of 
parliamentary seats.  
It might look as a triumph for 
the ruling party. But these results 
do not reflect the real mood of the 
people. All opinion polls before the 
elections showed support for the UR 
falling below 40%. So the 76% of 
the parliamentary seats that the UR 
claims to have obtained will hardly 
convince the majority of the electorate 
which abstained from the elections. 
A significant part of Russian society 
thinks that the elected Parliament lacks 
legitimacy.
These figures are quite misleading 
and do not reveal the serious 
contradictions in Russian society and its 
political and economic leadership. The 
State Duma is increasingly regarded as 
a meaningless body rubber stamping 
the draft laws that come from the 
Executive. 
Months before the elections 
top members of the ruling group 
understood how to organise genuinely 
free and fair elections. But why did the 
ruling group decide to rig the elections 
in such a naked and shameless manner? 
The feeling is that these developments 
show growing insecurity of the Russian 
“elite”. Recent opinion polls indicate 
a strong downfall of prestige of major 
state institutions as compared with 
just several months earlier. The State 
Duma’s support has dwindled from 
40% to 24%. The Government's 
prestige collapsed from 45 to 26%. 
Even the popularity of President 
Putin (that seemed unshakable after 
the Crimea returned to Russia) has 
dropped from 80% to 74%. 
This downward trend is a serious 
signal to Putin on the eve of the 
Presidential elections due to be held in 
March 2018. He finds himself between 
the hammer of powerful Western 
pressure and the anvil of people’s 
discontent with his socio-economic 
policy. 
One of the signs of this insecurity 
is his tendency to surround himself 
with weaker players. Right before the 
elections the Head of Presidential 
Administration, former KGB general 
Sergei Ivanov, unexpectedly retired. 
He was replaced by a practically 
unknown former head of Presidential 
Protocol Vaino – an ethnic Estonian 
with no previous record of senior 
State positions. Immediately after the 
elections the Speaker of Parliament 
(and a former Head of Presidential 
Administration) Sergei Naryshkin was 
appointed the Director of the External 
Intelligence Service. It is an obvious 
demotion of a person quite loyal to 
Putin but of political calibre at least 
equal to the President. This applies 
equally in the case of Sergei Ivanov… 
And then the constant reshuffle of 
security forces. A National Guard was 
formed on the basis of the Interior 
Ministry troops creating a complicated 
balance of forces between the Army, 
the Federal Security Service, the 
Interior Ministry and the National 
Guard. It seems to be another sign of 
the president’s insecurity. Three former 
members of his security team have 
been recently appointed governors of 
major regions. 
It would be wrong however to 
attribute the shock waves in Russia’s 
domestic policy to the personality of 
Putin. The tendency to concentrate 
power and to run the country nearly 
single-handedly finds its explanation in 
the deepening economic crisis of the 
last two years. 
This crisis in its turn has its roots 
in the inability of the ruling group 
to get rid of the total dependence 
of the economy on oil and gas and 
start the re-industrialisation of Russia 
on a modern technologic basis. This 
inability also has its roots. They are 
in the incompetence and corruption 
of a ruling group simply not fit by 
any standards to run such a huge 
and complicated country as Russia. 
They savagely exploit the tremendous 
economic resources created by the 
outstanding effort of the Soviet people 
during 70 years of Soviet power and 
hardly think as far as even 5 years 
ahead. 
However with the fall of world 
oil prices from 120 to 45-50 USD 
the Russian state budget collapsed. 
The only way to preserve economic 
and political stability chosen by the 
ruling group was to allow a two-fold 
devaluation of the ruble: from 36 
dollars a ruble in mid-2014 to 65 in 
mid-2016. Of course this was very 
profitable for raw material export-
oriented businesses and destructive 
for manufacturing, which strongly 
depends on imports. Thus oil and gas 
oligarchs became richer while the rest 
of the population became poorer. 
It is clear that there will be no return 
back to the oil prices of 120 USD a 
barrel. With 50% of the State budget 
formed from oil and gas profits the price 
of oil below 50 USD a barrel means a 
very big hole in the state coffers. But 
there is no replacement as all the talk 
of re-industrialisation remains at the 
level of empty declarations. There is 
neither a strong desire nor the required 
professional competence to start 
and run major industrial projects. 94 
billion USD are placed in US banks at 
a miserable 2-3% interest rate, while 
the Russian manufacturing sector 
is suffering from very inadequate 
investment.
The falling economy reflects itself 
in falling living standards. Officially this 
has gone down by 10%, but in fact by far 
more. The number of destitute people 
(a phenomenon practically unknown 
in the USSR) has reached a staggering 
figure of 22 million. The salaries of the 
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state and municipal workers are frozen 
while the official level of inflation 
last year was over 12%. The old age 
pensions are also effectively frozen, 
and there is increased talk of raising the 
pension age by 5 years. 
The State budget is frozen for the 
next three years at the level of 2016. 
Given the inflation rate this means 
that the budget will fall by at least 
10%. In the draft budget for 2017 the 
expenditures for health care go down 
by 25%, for employment assistance 
by 30%, and support for economic 
development and innovation by 22%. 
Budget cuts in education and 
science make the “modernisation” talk 
particularly meaningless. The feeling 
is that those who formulate Russia’s 
economic policy are determined to 
retain the country in the club of raw 
material suppliers and prevent its 
revival as an industrial power. It is not 
surprising as despite all the patriotic talk 
the ruling group of Russia remains an 
integral part of the global oligarchy. And 
the contradictions which sometimes 
emerge are a manifestation of the 
Russian elite’s strong determination 
to rob the country “without foreign 
interference”. 
So in order to fulfill the minimal 
social obligations the Government has 
to increase the fiscal burden on the 
population. New forms of taxation 
are introduced on a regular basis. 
Putin stubbornly refuses to drop the 
obviously bankrupt economic policy 
influenced by the “friends of the 
West” thus increasing social tension 
in the country. This in itself creates 
a breeding ground for wide-spread 
dissent. The mass media is tightly 
controlled by the ruling group. Because 
of a specific Russian mentality this does 
not always manifest itself in the public 
sphere. But the amount of anger is 
growing deep inside the hearts of the 
people.
One of the things giving rise to 
particularly strong indignation is a 
staggering level of corruption. It far 
surpasses even the countries which 
have become symbols of that evil. 
Society is shocked on a weekly basis 
by new corruption scandals. Recently a 
staggering sum of 120 million dollars in 
cash was found in the flat of a modest 
police colonel in Moscow. Notably 
he was serving in the Interior Ministry 
anticorruption unit. The lavish spending 
of the top members of the ruling group 
including members of the Government 
and the heads of the State corporations 
(including top 100 yachts at 80-90 
million USD and palaces in Europe 
at 100-120 million USD) show that 
the level of social differentiation has 
reached unprecedented proportions.  
This total negligence of the interests 
of Russia’s economic and social 
development is explained by the nature 
of its ruling class. It is a very narrow 
group (less than 2% of the population) 
consisting of rich and super-rich 
oligarchs and top bureaucrats. These 
two groups are closely intertwined 
with oligarchs occupying top positions 
in the government, with most of the 
ministers having highly profitable 
businesses. 
The only asset presented to the 
electorate was the return of Crimea to 
Russia. But the impact of this factor is 
dwindling. The nation is also asked to 
rally around the national leader to stand 
against Western economic, political 
and other sanctions. The patriotic card 
is strongly played by the ruling group. 
The hard fact however is that the most 
important socio-economic part of 
the Government – the Central Bank, 
Finance Ministry, Ministry of Economic 
Development, the two deputy Prime 
Ministers in charges of the economy – 
is firmly in the hands of the friends of 
the West.
The question which the Russian 
Communist Party asks is: How does 
President Putin manage to combine an 
anti-Western foreign policy stand with 
his “ugly capitalism” domestic policy? 
The recent appointment of Kirienko 
– former head of the Atomic Energy 
Agency and a well-known “friend of 
the West” – as the 1st Deputy Head 
of Presidential Administration is a 
signal that the pro-Western group 
is reinforcing its influence in the 
Kremlin. They are not interested in 
the development of Russia. It seems 
that the gradual destruction of Russia’s 
economic, scientific, educational 
and cultural potential is quite a 
conscientious policy of the influential 
part of the ruling group. 
Of course Putin’s tough stand on 
Syria and other international issues 
enjoys support and sympathy in 
Asia, Africa, Latin America and the 
Middle East. However this stand 
should be understood more through 
the prism of inter-imperialist rivalries 
than as a restoration of the anti-
imperialist internationalist stand of 
the USSR.
Even if the policy of the Kremlin 
appears to looks “back to the USSR”, in 
essence it is an attempt to defend the 
right of the Russian oligarchy to keep 
plundering the natural resources of the 
country and protecting this right against 
the old colonial powers.  
The Russian ruling group is part and 
parcel of global monopoly capital. The 
unexpected firmness of Putin’s stand on 
the international arena and increased 
defence spending is in the fact that the 
fate of Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam 
Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi are 
very ominous signals that he might be 
the next on the list.
So the economic and political crisis 
in Russia will keep deepening and no 
“triumphant” results of the elections 
will hide the fact that the ruling group 
is failing, just like the political and 
economic system imposed on Russia 
in 1991 following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
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